Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0 Confidential

FBIS

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC

Confidential

12 JULY 1972

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-011, No. 28)

Approved For Release 2005/N6/01313/NAIADP85T00875R000300050028-0

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention		1
INDOCHINA		
DRV Highlights Communists' Return to Paris, Assails President Hanoi Protests U.S. Air Strikes, Warns of Epidemics, Floods. Quang Tri: Fighting, People's Committees, "Crimes' Discussed. Moscow Calls U.S. Air Strikes "Genocide," Stresses Talks. Peking Stresses Need for Negotiated Victnam Settlement. Sihanouk Government Assails Notion of Indochina Cease-fire. Lao Princes Resume Contacts; NLHS Delegation Tours PRC, USSR		5 13 15 18
ROGERS IN EAST EUROPE	•	20
Hungarian, Romanian, Yugoslav Media Cive Cordial Treatment .	•	23
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA		
Prague Concedes Impasse, Urges Early Resumption of Talks	•	26
USSR-SYRIA		
"Satisfactory" Relations Reviewed During Al-Asad Moscow Visit	٠.	29
KOREA		
Joint Statement on Reunification Gets Continued Publicity		34

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB18 TRENDS 1.2 JULY 1972

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 JULY 1972

Moscow (2811 1tems)			Peking (1188 items)			
Castro USSR Visit	(15%)	11%	Domestic Issues	(31%)	42½	
Vietnam	(8%)	7%	Indochina	(28%)	18%	
Syrian President in USSR	()	6%	[Nixon 29 June Press Conference	()	92]	
10th Algerian Independence Day	()	5%	ROK-DPRK Reunification Talks	()	10%	
Baltic Sea Week, Rostok 9-15 July	()	3%	Sri Lanka Prime Minister in PRC	(17%)	8%	
Gromyko Netherlands Visit	()	2%	10th Algerian Independence Day	()	4%	
China	(2%)	2%	French Foreign Minister in PRC	()	3%	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Hanoi media have highlighted the return of the Vietnamese communist delegates for the scheduled reconvening of the Paris talks on 13 July, the first session since 4 May. The United States continues to be pictured as having been compelled to return to the talks by the pressure of the communist delegations and public opinion. However, Hanoi holds out little hope for a change in the U.S. attitude, a change it professes to see as imperative if there is to be progress. Broad-ranging attacks against President Nixon include a NHAN DAN article on the 8th which again made a derisive allusion to his trips to Peking and Moscow and observed that the U.S. attitude at Paris has always been negative.

In addition to continued charges that U.S. air strikes are aimed at North Vietnamese dikes and dams, Hanoi on 7 July publicized a DRV Falth Ministry statement claiming that hospitals and other medical installations have been bombed in an attempt to prevent care for the sick as well as those wounded in air strikes. Routine protests against the bombing continue to be issued virtually daily by the spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry.

Hanoi and Front media directly acknowledged the South Vietnamese counteroffensive in Quang Tri 10 days after it was launched on 28 June, with comment claiming that heavy losses have been inflicted on the allied forces. The counteroffensive also prompted a PRG Foreign Ministry statement protesting intensive air and artillery attacks, including the alleged use of bombs and shells "containing toxic chemicals."

As Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho passed through Peking on the way back to Paris, the Chinese have underscored their interest in a negotiated Vietnam settlement while acknowledging an obligation to support their allies against U.S. military pressure. In a major address on 9 July Chou En-lai appealed for "serious negotiations" on Vietnam and cited such developments as the recent agreement between the Korcan regimes as showing "an irresistible trend" in Asia toward accommodation on local problems free of outside interference.

Moscow commentators stress that the only way out of the war for the United States is through negotiations, and they reiterate support for the PRG seven-point proposal. Moscow has echoed Hanoi in claiming that the United States is carrying out "genocide" through its air strikes against the DRV.

DRV HIGHLIGHTS COMMUNISTS' RETURN TO PARIS, ASSAILS PRESIDENT

According to the VNA press review on 11 July, the Hanoi papers "splashed their front pages with big headlines" announcing the return to Paris of

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 2 -

the DRV's chief delegate Xuan Thuy and quoted him as reiterating the Vietnamese people's serious intentions regarding a settlement. The papers also reportedly noted PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's return to Paris after a trip to Italy. VNA on the 11th and the press on the 12th cryptically announced that Le Duc Tho, special adviser to the Paris conference, had left Hanoi that day for Paris.*

Kuan Thuy in his arrival statement echoed recent propaganda—as well as that when the Paris sessions resumed on 27 April after the U.S. suspension—in saying that the United States had agreed to resume the talks in the face of the demands by the Vietnamese and by American and world public opinion. Thuy's juxtaposing of the remark that he had returned to Paris to continue negotiations with the U.S. side with the observation that "as everybody knows" the United States has violated the pledge of October 1968 and has resumed the bombing of the DRV is striking in view of Hanoi's earlier demand that an end to the bombing was a necessary precondition for negotiations.

Taken at face value. Thuy's arrival statement indicated that no new communist proposal would be immediately forthcoming and that the stalemate would continue in the absence of a new U.S. initiative. He said the Vietnamese still consider the PRG's seven-point proposal of last July and the two-point elaboration advanced in February as providing the correct way to settle the problem, but he professed willingness to examine any "new" U.S. proposals which may be forthcoming. In claiming that the President's remarks at his 29 June press conference "were still very stubborn, warlike and distortions of the truth," Xuan Thuy failed to recall that the President on that occasion had repeated his 8 May suggestion that U.S. forces could be withdrawn from South Vietnam four months after the return of U.S. POWs and an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. However, a 3 July NHAN DAN Commentator article responding to the President's press conference had echoed earlier propaganda in characterizing the proposal as an "ultimatum-type argument."

^{*} Le Duc Tho had left Paris on 10 June and arrived in Hanoi on the 18th--the day Podgornyy left the DRV capital--via Moscow and Peking after attending the Dimitrov anniversary celebrations in Bulgaria. Tho had returned to Paris on 30 April, his first trip since a five-week stay from 24 June through 28 July 1971. His last previous trip to Paris before that was for the French CP Congress in January 1970. Xuan Thuy left Paris for Hanoi on 10 May this year, having been in Paris since late August 1970, when he had returned to the talks after a three-month sojourn in Hanoi.

- 3 -

Recent Hanoi propaganda has generally said little about specific proposals advanced by either side, and some criticisms of U.S. proposals by DRV spokesmen have not been reported by Hanoi media. Thus, Hanoi did not report DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's 22 June meeting with reporters at which when asked whether a cease-fire could be separated from political problems he responded that the PRG seven-point proposal of last July dealt with all the problems, including a cease-fire problem. Hanoi media also failed to carry the question-and-answer portion of Le Duc Tho's 12 May Paris press conference in which he posed the rhetorical question "how can there be a cease-fire if military and political issues are not settled?" Last February and March. after the President had outlined the U.S. eight-point proposal in his 25 January speech, propagandists in infrequent references to the call for a cease-fire dismissed it as a demand that the Vietnamese people lay down their arms and surrender.

References to the communists' negotiating position in recent propaganda have for the most part been in general terms with no such specific details as the call for the "immediate resignation" of President Thieu. However, this call had been repeated by Le Duc Tho in his 12 May Paris press conference and by Xuan Thuy in his remarks prepared for the 4 May Paris session.

ATTACKS ON Along with Hanoi's continuing, vitriolic attacks on PRESIDENT the President in connection with the air strikes against the DRV, a NHAN DAN article on 8 July entitled "Acute Problems of the United States" leveled a broadranging attack on the Nixon Administration. The article is available only in a VNA English-language summary and is not known to have been broadcast by Hanoi radio.* As reviewed by VNA, the article echoed other current propaganda in claiming that the President "is surpassing Johnson in brutality," and "has ordered a general genocidal war, striking even at the dikes and dams with a view to causing floods." It went on to say cryptically that the U.S. attitude at the Paris conference "has always been a negative one," and, judging from the VNA version, said nothing about the scheduled resumption of the talks.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 4 -

The author repeated the standard contention that the U.S. escalation in the North was undertaken out of desperation over the "losing" situation in the South. And in obvious allusion to the President's Peking and Moscow trips, he said that "Nixon's journeys abroad" have been publicized to divert attention from domestic problems and "to sow illusions" about the Vietnam question. He maintained that the President's diplomatic moves reflected weakness and said: "The many international agreements Nixon has concluded have had very few practical results and have brought about no change in the world halance of power which is increasingly changing to the disadvantage of the United States."

Allusions to the President's summitry also appeared in an article in the June issue of the DRV's party journal HOC TAP, now available in translation. The article followed the pattern of articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN after the President's Moscow trip in critically citing, without identification, some of the President's statements during his Moscow visit.* HOC TAP juxtaposed quotations from the President on defending and preserving peace with accounts of U.S. military action in Vietnam as the President was speaking. Like the earlier articles, HOC TAP cited the President's remarks about the victims of the siege of Leningrad, also without identifying the locale. But it did make the reference to the Soviet Union more apparent than the Hanoi dailies had done when it reported that the President spoke about a girl named "Tanya."

In addition to its criticism of the President's Moscow visit, the HOC TAP article, in touching on an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina, made an uncharacteristic comparison with the Middle East cease-fire. Presumably the atypical reference to the Middle East was an oblique jab at the Soviet Union for failing to back up its Arab clients. Thus the article observed that when Nixon speaks of a cease-fire throughout Indochina "he wants to apply in Indochina a trick that the U.S. imperialists had used in the Middle East, forcing the Arab countries to recognize the Israeli aggressors' occupation of the Arab territories seized by Israel."

An editorial in the same issue of HOC TAP on Vietnamese determination to continue their struggle also contained polemical overtones. It observed that the mining and blockading of the DRV "is an

^{*} See the 7 June 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-4.

- 5 -

insolent challenge to the socialist and other countries maintaining trade relations," although it did go on to say that the more bellicose the U.S. stand, the more strongly socialist and other peoples will support and assist the Vietnamese. It also scored the President's "deceitful diplomatic tricks" and went on to assail the proposal for an Indochina cease-fire as well as the U.S. eight-point proposal.

HANOI PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKES, WARNS OF EPIDEMICS, FLOODS

Hanoi's denunciation of the U.S. bombing in the North includes the new charge that the United States is creating conditions in which there could be wide-spread epidemics and health problems. A 7 July statement by the Public Health Ministry, released at a press conference by Nguyen Van Tin, Vice Minister of Public Health, went beyond statements issued by that ministry in May and last December when it charged the Nixon Administration with the "cruel and premeditated scheme" of bombing and strafing hospitals and other sanitary establishments in the DRV and warned that "if any epidemic occurs in North Vietnam, the full responsibility for this will rest with the bellicose Nixon clique."*

Asserting that during the period 7 April to 30 June the U.S. attacked "30 sanitary establishemnts" of the DRV, including 21 central, municipal, provincial, and district hospitals, the statement alleged that these actions were intended "to kill physicians and destroy facilities of treatment and first-aid care in an attempt to bring about a disruption in the health service and deprive the sick and wounded or places of treatment." Claiming that the Quyen Lap leprosarium in Nghe An Province had been bombed seven times since 17 April and that "thousands of lepers" were now deprived of a place for treatment, the statement warned that "the lack of isolation places for people affected with infectious diseases would favor catatrophic epidemics."

^{*} Health Ministry statements on 14 May 1972 and on 31 December 1971, in less emotional terms, had denounced the United States for allegedly attacking hospitals and other medical installations. The December statement had singled out strikes on 26, 27, and 29 December—strikes which prompted two DRV Foreign Ministry statements as well as a routine-level protest by the foreign ministry spokesman. The May statement protested incidents which allegedly took place between 11 and 27 April.

Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 6 -

The statement also claimed that two health centers administered by the Health Ministry--the Bach Mai hospital and the Vietnam-USSR friendship hospital -- were among the major hospitals hit in recent U.S. air strikes. The raid on Bach Mai hospital, called "the greatest health center of the DRV," allegedly took place on 27 June when U.S. rockets destroyed wards of internal diseases, surgical, obstetric, and psychiatric sections as well as much equipment. The alleged attack on the Vietnam-USSR friendship hospital occurred on 10 May and a "large-size demolition bomb" was said to have destroyed the laboratory and valuable medical equipment as well as "seriously damaging" other sections and wards. Asserting that "steel pellet bombs" as well as "dart bombs" had been used to kill patients and medical workers, the statement also claimed that the Vietnam-Czechoslovakia friendship hospital in Haiphong, the Nam Ha provincial hospital, the Thanh Hoa provincial hospital as well as several town and district hospitals, regional anti-TB and opthalmological hospitals, drugstores, and seats of provincial health services were among those medical institutions hit recently. The statement contained a plea to "all international and national health organizations, all physicians and scientists devoted to human well-being" to condemn the U.S. action "more strongly and to take effective steps to stay their criminal hands." (In a similar vein, the Health Ministry statement last May had called on medical workers "in the whole world, including America," to protest the U.S. "crimes.")

Hanoi has also continued its allegations that air strikes are being aimed at the DRV's vast network of coastal and river dikes. And VNA on 6 July reported an article published in NHAN DAN that day by Nguyen Xuen, head of the meteorological service of the DRV, which lashed out at the United States for attempting to wage a "geophysical or climatological war" aimed at "making use of meteorologic conditions in military plana." Assailing the United States for attempting to synchronize natural calamities with strikes against civilian targets, the article charged that "the bombing of dikes before the period of floods is an utterly wicked design in the entire U.S. scheme of genocide in Vietnam."

Pointing to the vital need for a sound system of dikes in the DRV, the article noted that "in our history, floods and the breaking of dikes have resulted in many great disasters, which caused great losses in lives and property in vast areas." Refuting recent White House statements that dike breaks would be due to poor maintenance rather than U.S. air strikes, the article proudly pointed to the DRV's dikes as part of "a persistent struggle"

- 7 -

waged by the Vietnamese people "for thousands of years, spending thousands of millions of days building a dike system of thousands of kilometers." "In magnitude," it claimed, "this achievement is second to no other works of mankind." Strongly denouncing the U.S. for bombing the dikes "at the approach of the monsoon," the article warned that the dikes "will be very vulnerable when there is heavy swelling" and declared that the responsibility for dike breaks will rest with the United States. The author explained that as a meteorologist it was his duty to alert people throughout the world, "especially geophysicists and climatologists who, more than anyone else, can fathom the disastrous consequences of such an extremely inhuman move."

More specific charges against the United States for alleged attacks on dikes were detailed in an 8 July VNA report which claimed that during the last three months "U.S. aircraft have made 27 bombing raids against dikes and dams in Thanh Hoa Province and killed scores of people busy filling up some bomb craters." It was also charged that from 1 to 6 July U.S. planes had damaged vital dike sites during raids in Hai Hung Province. claimed that the Bai Thuong dam on the Chu River in Thanh Hoa Province had also been hit. Additional details on the 6 July strike at the Bai Thuong dam, "one of the biggest irrigation projects in North Vietnam," was provided by VNA on the 10th when it publicized the remarks of local officials denouncing the attack. After noting that the dam had been hit by "eight 2,000-pound demolition bombs," a local engineer observed that "bombing the dam with the intention to destroy it is a monstrous act which is calculated to cause famine and floods that would jeopardize the life and property of hundreds of thousands of people."

Arguing that U.S. strikes at dikes and dams have stirred the "great indignation of the progressive public all over the world," a Hanoi radio commentary on 11 July characterized Laird's 6 July "admission" that U.S. strikes might have done indirect damage to sluices as an "unwilling confession" motivated by pressure from world public opinion which proves that "the Nixon clique dares not deny any more the overly obvious truth." The commentary then lashed out at Laird for reportedly repeating after his press conference on the 6th "the odious slander that the Vietnamese people have not taken adequate care of the dike system." It also asserted that Laird's "confession" of a part of his crimes and the denial of responsibility for bombing dikes and dams cannot deceive or placate the world public.

- 8 -

PLANES DOWNED OVER HANOI

Propaganda comment marking the alleged downing of the 300th U.S. plane over Hanoi underscored the DRV's vigilance and determination to

continue the struggle. Hanoi radio on 8 July reported that three U.S. aircraft were downed over the capital that day, bringing the total to 300. Claiming that the strikes against Hanoi on the 8th revealed the President's "deceitful allegations concerning his initiative in seeking serious negotiations," the report portrayed the shooting down of the 300th U.S. aircraft as "the unswerving answer of the Hanoi people to the U.S. aggressors" which expressed the "powerful, concentrated, and accurate bullet trajectories of the capital's firenet at the U.S. air pirates at the very moment they violated the Hanoi sky." The report asserted that as long as the "U.S. aggressors commit crimes, the Hanoi people will continue to fight against them, smash them and frighten them out of their wits." Asserting that the downing of the 300th U.S. aircraft over Hanoi "is indeed a glorious feat of arms," the report routinely stated that bombs and shells "will never shake the iron determination of the Hanoi army and people."

Hanoi's feat was celebrated at a mass meeting held in the capital on 11 July. A letter of commendation from President Ton Duc Thang, read at the gathering, called on the "capital's compatriots" to heighten their vigilance, intensify antiaircraft activities, and to concentrate on making new contributions to "completely defeating the U.S. aggressors."

The 300th downing also drew laudatory editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 9 July. Adding an additional plane to the total downed on the 8th, NHAN DAN claimed that four planes were shot down over Hanoi, bringing the total to 301. The editorial praised local public security forces, civil defense forces, cadres of all echelons, and the Hanoi people for making the capital "one of the ireas that has shot down the most U.S. aircraft." In an apparent effort to improve civil air defense work, the editorial noted that "many people still regard the enemy lightly and have not correctly enforced air defense discipline." Air defense and medical treatment activities were, however, termed "satisfactory" and it was confidently asserted that Hanoi's economic and cultural activities "continue to be firmly maintained and that the Hanoi people's daily life has been cared for and insured." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial characterized the downing of the 300th U.S. aircraft as "proof of the marvelous combat skills of the Hanoi armed forces and people." The editorial portrayed

- 9 -

Hanot as a "heroic steel fortress" where "each inhabitant is a killer of Americans." As of 12 July, it was claimed that a total of 3,743 "U.S. aggressor aircraft" have been shot down over the DRV.

FORE IGN MINISTRY

SPOKE SMAN STATEMENTS

in the 7 July Health Ministry statement, continuing foreign ministry spokesman's statements protesting U.S. bombing raids during the past week leveled the following specific charges:

- + A statement on the 7th alleged that a dike section of the Luoc River in Hai Hung Province and "many populated areas" of Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces were hit in U.S. air strikes on 6 and 7 July. The statement also charged that B-52's dropped bombs on a number of localities in the Vinh Linh area. Asserting that U.S. bombings and shellings have killed and wounded innocent people and destroyed economic and cultural establishments, the protest specifically noted that a dike section in Hung Ha district and the Tra Ninh canal in Thai Thuy district, Thai Binh Province, a dike section in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province, and the Bai Thuong dam in Tho Xuan district, Thanh Hoa Province, had been destroyed in strikes on the 6th.
- + Focusing on 8 July strikes at Hanoi, the protest of that same day noted that a number of factories and the Bach Mai hospital had been bombed. It was also charged that U.S. raids on the 7th were aimed at populated areas on the outskirts of Haiphong, and in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh area. Denouncing the Nixon Administration for continuing to strike at many populated areas in the DRV, the statement cited "world public opinion" as demanding that the United States "negotiate seriously at the Paris conference on Vietnam."
- + The statement on the 10th condemned the United States for striking at Hanoi on 8 July and for sending aircraft to strike at populous areas on the outskirts of Haiphong and in Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Nar a, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces on the 8th and 9th. It was claimed that these air strikes had killed or wounded many civilians and destroyed conomic and cultural establishments including dike sections in Nam Ninh district, Nam Ha Province, in Chi Linh district in Hai Hung Province, and in Nam Sach district,

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 10 -

also in Hai Hung Province. The protest pointed to "these criminal war acts" to buttress its charge that the Nixon Administration "persists in pursuing the policy of striking at the DRV's populated areas, dikes and dam systems, and water conservancy projects."

- + "Sternly condemning" the United States for air strikes on 11 July, the protest on the same day claimed that U.S. aircraft had bombed the dikes along the Thai Binh and Kinh Thay rivers in Nam Sach and Chi Linh districts, Hai Hung Province. It said that "dozens of bombs" had been dropped into a "nearly 300 meter-long section of the dike in Nam Hung village, Nam Sach district." Asserting that during the past three months the Nixon Administration has "deliberately struck" dike systems, the statement charged the United States with attempting to "weaken these systems so as to cause floods in North Vietnam with incalculable consequences."
- + U.S. strikes on 10 and 11 July were protested in a statement on the 12th which claimed that U.S. bombs and rockets had "killed and wounded many innocent people" on the outskirts of Haiphong city and in Ninh Binh, Hai Duong, Thai Binh, and Phu Ly municipalities as well as in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. B-52's were said to have dropped bombs on several dikes and on the Lan and Co Tien canals in Thai Binh Province and the Con Vinh and Doanh Chau canals in Hai Hau district, Nam Ha Province.

QUANG TRI: FIGHTING, PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES, "CRIMES" DISCUSSED

The South Vietnamese government counteroffensive launched in Quang Tri on 28 June was first directly acknowledged by Hanoi on 7 July when QUAN DOI NHAN DAN ridiculed Saigon's reports that its troops had entered the provincial capital. On the same day Hanoi radio ridiculed Saigon's capture of weapons, explaining that they were those the allies had abandoned in their earlier retreat from Quang Tri. On the 8th, LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) reviewed alleged communist achievements in Quang Tri and Thua Thien during the first 10 days of the counteroffensive. LPA claimed that from 28 June to 7 July the PLAF in these provinces had killed or wounded 3,850 troops, shot down 33 planes, and destroyed 51 military vehicles, mostly tanks and armored cars. These feats were hailed in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 9th, and on

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 11 -

the 10th a NHAN DAN article claimed that an additional 600 troops had been "annihilated" on the 8th, bringing the total Saigon losses in the campaign to 4,450.

PRG FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT

Intensive allied bombing and shelling since the start of the counteroffensive were protested in an 11 July statement

by the PRG Foreign Ministry which charged that hundreds of B-52's, hundreds of tactical planes, and dozens of U.S. warships have been used to "brutally bomb and shell by day and night many heavily populated areas in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces." Among other specific acts, the statement decried the alleged B-52 "carpet" bombing of Binh La hamlet, Tr'eu Phong district, "killing and wounding hundreds of civilians and burning down nearly 100 houses." The statement also accus d the United States of using "poison gas, phosphorous bombs, and napalm bombs" in raids in densely populated areas in and around the Quang Tri provincial capital, in Dong Ha district town, and in many villages. Specifically, according to the statement, on 8 and 9 July bombs and artillery shells "containing toxic chemicals" were used against the provincial capital and La Vang hamlet, Hai Lang district, and Van Phong and Dong Bao hamlets, Trieu Phong district," "As a result," the statement charged, "thousands of people were affected, of whom many old persons, children, and women subsequently died."

The alleged use of toxic chemicals to "massacre" people and other "barbarous crimes" were labeled an "extremely gross infringement upon international law and human morality" which exposed the "cruel nature of U.S. imperialists" and the "deceitful allegations of the Nixon Administration about 'peace' and 'good will.'" The statement "sternly denounced" the "savage extermination war acts" and coutinely demanded the Administration end the war in South Vietnam, stop Vietnamization, end acts of war in the North, seriously negotiate in Paris, and positively respond to the PRG proposal. It warned that the allies must bear full responsibility for the consequences of "their criminal war acts" and declared that the PRG "in legitimate self defense reserves for itself the right to take all necessary political and military measures to deal with the said criminal var acts, crimes of genocide and ecocide of the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam."

Since the communist offensive was launched this spring, the PRG had released two foreign ministry statements—on 7 May and 24 June—condemning alleged allied crimes in South Vietnam. The May statement—coming shortly after the fall of Quang Tri Province to

FBIS TRENDS 12 JULY 1972

- 12 -

the communists--particularly scored intensive U.S. bombing and shelling of newly "liberated" populated areas and a similar protest was voiced in the June statement. Neither of these statements mentioned the use of ". Aic chemicals," and the alleged use of bombs and shells containing such chemicals is not known to have been raised in any other recent PRG Foreign Ministry statement. The communists have repeatedly denounced the allied spraying of "toxic chemicals" which kill plants and animals and poison people, and the alleged use of "gas bombs" has been scored occasionally--for example in a war crimes committee communique, publicized on 4 January, on the use of chemical warfare in South Vietnam in 1971. The use of "chemical" bombs against populated areas in North Vietnam was charged in a DRV war crimes commission communique, released by Hanoi on 9 June, which cited instances when U.S. planes allegedly dropped "CS bombs."

Liberation Radio on 11 July broadcast a communique QUANG TRI dated 5 July from the Quang Tri provincial NFLSV COMMITTEE committee amouncing that a congress held in June had elected a provincial People's Revolutionary Committee, headed by a Mr. Le San--described as "an old revolutionary." Following the communist capture of Quang Tri Province at the beginning of May, Front media had publicized communiques attributed to a Quang Tri People's Revolutionary Committee, including one communique dated as early as 24 April.* At that time, the membership of the committee was not mentioned. The formal election now would seem to be a part of a communist effort to establish the legitimacy of their political control in the area. The announcement of the members of the committee was accompanied by an appeal from it and the NFLSV for the people to carry out their tasks and repulse allied counterattacks.

Hanoi sensitivity to allied statements that the communists had failed to carry out uprisings and gain control of the people was reflected in a NHAN DAN article on the 11th which repeated claims that many uprisings had occurred in the past three months and that more than 2 million people had been "liberated." The article, attributed to Kha Anh, argued that current achievements had to be assessed in the context of the allied pacification effort in recent years and that "only by reviewing the difficulties, hardships, and sacrifices of our compatriots and combatants can we realize their present glorious victories." Citing allied

^{*} See the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 25-27.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 13 -

measures since 1969 to destroy the revolutionary infrastructure, the author emotionally declared that the hardships and difficulties faced by some compatriots in the South were inadequately reflected in slogans about bearing misfortunes and maintaining positions. And he noted that "countless comrades have operated underground for many years. Countless comrades have died anonymously in protecting the revolution."

MOSCOW CALLS U J. AIR STRIKES "GENOCIDE," STRESSES TALKS

Moscow comment continues to focus on the "genocidal" U.S. war in North Vietnam, singling out the "meterological war" as well as the bombings of dikes and civilian targets. Yuriy Zhukov, in a PRAVDA article summarized by Radio Moscow in English on 10 July, asserted that the war has taken on "two qualitatively new forms," the bombing of the dikes and the "meterological warfare" in which the United States causes torrential rains chemically. He asserted that U.S. experiments with artifically-induced rain in Indochina have been going on for years. "Ambiguous disclosures" U.S. officials are now making, he said, are an attempt to "blackmail the Vietnamese people through barely veiled threats." He concluded routinely, however, that the United States cannot attain a "military solution" and that a peaceful solution can be found "only through negotiations," and he reiterated support for the "well-known" PRG and DRV proposals. A similar Zhukov article in the 7 July PRAVDA assailed U.S. bombings of dikes and dams in the DRV, comparing the action to Nazi bombings in the Netherlands and stressing the potential destructiveness of floods in the DRV. He cited recent eyewitness accounts to refute President Nixon's 29 June assertion that such reports are "inaccurate."

Brief Moscow reports of Secretary Laird's 6 July press conference noted that he "admitted" that some imes DRV dams and dikes might have been damaged if they were incated in the vicinity of military targets but added that American pilots have not been given orders to destroy the dams and dikes. Moscow contrasts the Secretary's "admission" with President Nixon's "denial," in his 29 June press conference, that the United States was doing such bombing.

Commentators insist that in spite of the bombings, DRV morale remains high and that a "military solution" is impossible for the Americans. Commentators repeatedly stress that the Paris

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 14 -

negotiations, which will resume on 13 July, are the "only way" out of the war for the United States, and they reiterate support for the PRG's seven-point peace plan. When Xuan Thuy passed through Moscow on 9-10 July on his way back to Paris from Hanoi, he met with Katushev, CPSU official Rakhmanin, and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, for a talk in "an atmosphere of friendship and cordiality," according to TASS. When he had returned to Hanoi last May he had met with Kosygin, but there seems to be no discernible pattern in Moscow's treatment of Xuan Thuy during these stopovers; over the years he has been variously reported as seeing Kosygin, Katushev, or no leaders at all.

Moscow continues to defend its detente policy in some of the comment on Vietnam. Aleksei Leontyev, in a foreign-language radio commentary on 8 July scoring U.S. military action in the North, declared that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, which stems from the inadmissibility of the use of force to solve international disputes, does not mean denying nations the right to wage armed resistance to aggression. He made a similar comment in a RED STAR article on the 9th assailing U.S. "atrocities" in North Vietnam. Routine-level broadcasts in Mandarin continue to score Peking for refusing to join in united action to support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their struggle. A 7 July broadcast referred to Podgornyy's reassertion, in his 6 July speech at a dinner for a visiting Syrian delegation, that the USSR will continue to give "all-round help" to the people of Vietnam and the rest of Indochina, and it elaborated on military and economic aid the USSR has provided the DRV. It concluded that the Chinese leaders' "splittist stand" is a cause for regret because it damages the Indochinese people's national liberation movement.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 15 -

PEKING STRESSES NEED FOR NEGOTIATED VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

In the week before the resumption of the Paris conference, as DRV negotiators Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho passed through Peking on their way to Paris, the Chinese have made even clearer their interest in a negotiated Vietnam settlement in keeping with what they hail as an evolving trend of detente in Asia. Following the emphasis on a negotiated settlement in Peking's carefully balanced reaction to President Nixon's 29 June remarks on Vietnam, Chou En-lai lent his authoritative voice to the call for "serious negotiations" by citing "an irresistible trend" toward reasonable settlements of "mutual disputes" among the peoples free of superpower control. At the same time the Chinese have made clear their obligation to continue backing their Vietnamese allies in the face of U.S. military pressure.

In a major address at a 9 July banquet welcoming a delegation from South Yemen, Chou called attention to the recent agreement between the rival Korean regimes, the Indian-Pakistani accord at Simla, and new movement in Sino-Japanese relations as developments demonstrating a trend toward accommodation in troubled situations without outside interference. Drawing a lesson for the Vietnam question, Chou pointed out that the situation in the Far East remains "far from truly relaxed" because the United States persists in its "military aggression and political interference" in Indochina and does not let the people of that region "settle their own issues." Chou reiterated Peking's demand that the United States withdraw its troops and "completely cease its support" for the Thieu and Lon Non governments and "the Lao rightists," and he invoked world public opinion as "strongly demanding" that Washington end the war "at an early date through serious negotiations." Chou did not mention the Paris talks and avoided either attacking the U.S. negotiating position or endorsing the communists' peace plans.

Chou also took the occasion to lecture the United States that its "war threats," such as "wanton bombing, mining and blockading" measures, would not subdue the Vietnamese and would "stimulate the people of China" and all over the world to give "even greater sympathy and support" to the Indochinese "in fighting to the end." This bland formulation, however, falls well short of past Chinese pledges of "support and assistance" in response to an unshirkable internationalist duty.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 16 -

Two days before Chou's address, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei assailed the U.S. military measures at a banquet for French Foreign Minister Schumann. As in earlier recent Chinese pronouncements, Chi pointed out that the Vietnamese communists "are not alone" in their struggle and he pledged continuing Chinese "support" for the war effort. He said that the only way to settle the Indochina questions is for the United States to withdraw its troops and its support for Thieu and the others, but he did not use the occasion to raise the question of a negotiated settlement.*

Chou's stress on negotiation and accommodation was anticipated by NCNA's 6 July account of the President's press conference remarks on Vietnam. NCNA highlighted the President's announcement that the Paris talks would resume and, in concluding a carefully measured assessment of the issues, expressly adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the coming negotiations. NCNA claimed that the President's remarks indicated that the United States will persist in its "unjustifiable stand" on the Vietnam question, but the only issue argued in this context was that of a coalition government in South Vietnam. Rebutting the President's statement that the communists want to impose a communist regime in the South, NCNA noted that the communists propose "a broadly represented, neutral government of national concord." As in Peking's reaction at the time of the President's 8 May peace proposals, NCNA acknowledged without challenging his recapitulation of the proposals for a cease-fire, repatriation of POW's, and a complete troop withdrawal in four months under these conditions. While defending the communists' "justifiable stand" on a coalition government, NCNA avoided endorsing the communists' peace plans.**

^{*} On the same occasion Schumann, putting confidence above modesty, declared that the French "know the terms of a true settlement" in Vietnam as revealed by de Gaulle in Phnom Penh six years ago. Indochina may have been one of the subjects on which, as both sides acknowledged during the visit, the Chinese and French have divergent views. Schumann's meetings with the Chinese were uniformly described as "friendly" except—rather surprisingly—for his talk with Mao, which NCNA characterized as "friendly and frank."

^{**} NCNA's selective account of Le Duc Tho's 12 May statement to the press in Paris quoted Tho's reiteration of terms calling for a U.S. troop withdrawal and for a government of three segments but excised a phrase—the only part omitted from a passage left otherwise intact—saying these terms are "as envisaged" by the PRG's seven-point plan and its 2 February elaboration of the "two key points."

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 17 -

In charging that it has been the United States that has been guilty of imposing regimes on South Vietnam, NCNA claimed that the U.S. actions have been the result of "the tearing up of the 1954 Geneva agreement to shreds"—a formulation reminiscent of Peking's longheld contention that the accords are no longer a valid framework for a settlement. In recent months Peking had been more equivocal on this score in charging that the United States had violated the accords and leaving open the question of their continuing viability.

XUAN THUY, LE DUC THO STOPOVERS IN PEKING During their current stopovers in Peking--Xuan Thuy arrived on 6 July and departed on the 8th; Le Duc Tho arrived on the 11th--

the DRV negotiators en route to Paris have been received on the same level as when they passed through on their way home, but there have been hints of strained Sino-Vietnamese relations. Thuy was again greeted and seen off at the airport by Keng Piao, head of the CCP's liaison department, who also hosted a banquet at which toasts were delivered to "the constant consolidation and development of the revolutionary friendship and militant unity" of the two countries. According to NCNA, Thuy also had "a fraternal and cordial talk" with Chou En-lai. As in other recent Sino-Vietnamese contacts, this formulation departs from Peking's standard characterization of "very cordial and friendly" relations with close allies—the formulation used for Thuy's meeting with Chou in May.

As on his previous stopover, Tho was met at the airport and then given a banquet by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. Unlike the previous occasion, however, NCNA's account made no mention of toasts at the banquet.

Taking part in the meetings with the Vietnamese negotiators was DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who on 28 June signed an aid agreement and whose stay has now extended since 3 May. Unlike Thuy's stopover in May, NCNA did not report the presence at the airport of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov, though Thuy again passed through Moscow as well as Peking. Similarly, NCNA had not mentioned Tolstikov when Tho arrived from Paris via Moscow on 17 June. In contrast, NCNA reported Tolstikov's presence at the 5 July departure for Moscow of a Pathet Lao delegation that had visited Peking.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 18 -

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT ASSAILS NOTION OF INDOCHINA CEASE-FIRE

Sihanouk's government remains stridently inflexible on the issue of an Indochina accommodation, particularly attacking the notion of a cease-fire, at a time when Peking has avoided attacking President Nixon's proposals on an Indochina cease-fire and has stressed the need for a negotiated settlement. A 28 June statement by a spokesman of Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU), duly carried by NCNA, represented the first official reaction to the President's 8 May proposal. It attacked the President's "fraudulent maneuvers" and his "'preparations for serious negotiations to stop the war in Indochina' for the purpose of obtaining a 'cease-fire on the spot.'" "Categorically rejecting" the cease-fire plan, the statement said that as regards Cambodia the proposal is aimed only at dividing the country and saving the Lon Nol "clique."

A 6 July commentary by AKI, the press agency of Sihanouk's government, echoed the RGNU statement in even more emphatic terms. It criticized President Nixon for "running around the world selling his false peace," going "out of his way to knock at every door, setting forth a host of proposals, giving interviews, holding press conferences, calling for the so-called peace, cease-fire, roundtable negotiations, and so forth." Calling his activities a "farce" to extricate houself from defeats in Indochina and to gain reelection, the commentary asserted that the Cambodian people, under the "judicious leadership" of the FUNK, will not be taken in, will reject his cease-fire, and will continue to attack on all fronts.

During his current foreign tour Sihanouk has voiced similar complaints, making his strongest statements in Albania. In a 28 June speech he condemned the President's "psychological war on an international scale" and the proposals for an internationally supervised ceasefire and convocation of a Geneva-type conference, calling this an effort to "divide Indochina." In earlier speeches, however, he restricted similar remarks to the Cambodian context, and his comments resembled complaints made last January and February in official RGNU statements assailing President Nivon's eight-point peace plan revealed in his 25 January speech. RGNU comment at that time had criticized the United States for "inventing such deceitful tricks as 'on-the-spot cease-fire,' 'peace negotiations,' 'partition of Cambodia, ' 'referendum, ' 'international conference, ' 'government of national reconciliation, and other fraudulent formulas of compromise." Those statements came at a time when the DRV, in a 1 February foreign ministry spokesman's statement, was dismissing "fabricated reports" that it had engaged in indirect approaches to Phnom Penh concerning

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 19 -

"a separate peace in Cambodia." At a 19 March Peking banquet marking the second anniversary of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking after his overthrow, both Sihanouk and Chou En-lai assailed "certain powers" for their efforts to promote a compromise in Cambodia that would split the FUNK and undermine the unity of the Cambodian and the other Indochinese peoples. The unnamed targets were presumably the Soviets and possibly the French as would-be negotiations, although the remarks could also be read as a warning to the North Vietnamese.

Coming as they do in the wake of the President's visit to Moscow and Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi, Sihanouk's recent comments seem to have an anti-Soviet ring. He has made clear in other remarks that the target of his criticism was the Soviet Union, as in his repeated attacks on "some 'anti-imperialist' countries and governments which allegedly went 'freedom and justice'" for failing to recognize his government on the ground that it is an exile regime. In a 28 June speech in Albania he denounced "some foreign collaborating governments" for aiding President Nixon in his peace "maneuvers," and in an earlier speech in Albania, on 24 June, he condemned those states "claiming to be thirsty for peace, freedom, and justice" which "do not react with determination and effective acts against the aggression of the United States in Indochina."

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 20 -

LAO PRINCES RESUME CONTACTS; NLHS DELEGATION TOURS PRC, USSR

Correspondence between Lao Premier Souvanna Phouma and NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong on the issue of a political settlement has been resumed after an interruption of several months. The resumption comes at a time when an NLHS delegation has been touring the PRC and USSR and in the wake of a joint political conference of the NLHS and Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF).

On 6 July the Vientiane domestic service reported that Souvanna Phouma on the 1st sent a message proposing that Souphanouvong send a plenipotentiary representative to Vientiane to discuss "conditions for a general cease-fire" in Laos. According to the broadcast, Souvanna Phouma's letter was prompted by both "the seriously deteriorating situation caused by the intensification of North Vietnamese aggression" and also "the efforts of the various big powers towards peaceful coexistence." Pathet Lao media on the 7th reported a message from Souphanouvong dated the 2d which called for a settlement of the Lao question "by putting an immediate end to U.S. intervention and aggression in Laos" and proposed that he send his "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak to Vientiane. It is not clear whether Souphanouvong's message is in response to Souvanna Phouma's -- dated just one day earlier--but as if in answer to Souvanna Phouma's reference to the "big powers," Souphanouvong asserted that the Lao internal situation "should definitely not be attached to and controlled by the external situation." On 10 July the Vientiane domestic service reported a message from Souvanna Phouma, dated the 8th, agreeing to the return of Tiao Souk Vongsak and agreeing that the Lao question must be solved "without any involvement with the problems of other countries and without foreign interference."

BACKGROUND ON PRINCES' CONTACTS

Correspondence between the princes on the question of a Lao settlement began in March 1970 and Tiao Souk Vongsak was first

sent to Vientiane in August that year. Failure to agree on differing cease-fire proposals led to his recall to Sam Neua in August 1971. A 22 June 1971 NLHS proposal had suggested a simultaneous bombing halt and cease-fire throughout Laos, but in a hardline letter dated 20 November 1971 Souphanouvong had reverted to the tougher demand that the United States "first of all" stop the bombings so that the Lao parties concerned could meet and settle their own affairs. Since then the correspondence has continued fitfully, with Souvanna Phouma on 27 November and 18 February rejecting calls for a total bombing halt but

FBIS TRENDS 12 JULY 1972

- 21 -

expressing willingness to receive an envoy from Souphanouvong, and the NLHS leader on 16 December and 24 January repeating demands that the Lao situation be settled "on the basis of the NLHS five points, the proposals of 27 April and 22 June 1971, the 1962 Geneva agreements and the present realities in Laos." In December Souphanouvong also repeated his insistence that the U.S. bombing be halted "first of all," but this demand did not appear in his January letter or in the one dated 2 July.

NLHS-PNF CONFERENCE

A "joint political meeting" of the NLHS Central Committee and the PNF Alliance Committee was held from 20 to 24 June in Sam Neua, just prior to both the reopening of the correspondence between the princes and the departure of the ALHS delegation on its tour of the PRC and USSR. A joint statement, carried by the Pathet Lao radio on 28 June, said that the conference--held at a time of "enormous victories" by the Lao armed forces in "harmony" with those of the Vietnamese and Cambodian patriots and in the face of "frantic" U.S. escalation in Indochina--evaluated the implementation of tasks set forth at earlier conferences and "analyzed the new situation and urgent tasks to be implemented." The statement reiterated that the Lao issue must be settled on the basis of the 6 March 1970 NLHS five-point solution and the additional proposal of 22 June 1971. It noted that the conference supported the NLHS' effort to seek every possible means to continue the meetings and talks between the envoys of Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma, and it once again called upon Souvanna Phouma to accept the "patriotic forces' reasonable proposals" and free himself from pressures of the "U.S. imperialists and the ultrarightist clique." In another passage it repeated the demand that the United States "stop the bombings of Lao territory in order to create a favorable condition for talks among the Lao parties concerned."

NLHS TOUR The NLHS delegation visiting the PRC and USSR has received relatively little publicity, perhaps in deference to the sensitivities of the host countries, both of which maintain diplomatic relations with the Vientiane government. The purpose of the tour has not been made clear, but the positions of some of the Chinese and Soviet officials taking part indicate that aid has been a topic of discussion. The timing of the tour suggests that the situation of Laos in an Indochina settlement may also be on the agenda. The delegation, led by Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the NLHS Central Committee standing committee, stopped over in Hanoi "on its way to visit a number of socialist countries, according to VNA on 26 June. The group had talks with Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 22 -

The delegation paid a "friendly visit" to the PRC from 27 June to 5 July, with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien as the ranking Chinese host. Among the Chinese officials involved were Keng "iao, head of the CCP's liaison department; Wang Hsin-ting, a PLA deputy chief of staff; Li Chiang, vice minister of foreign trade (who signed the 28 June supplementary aid agreement with the DRV); Fang I, the Chinese ald minister; and Yuan Hua-ping, head of the armaments section of the PLA logistics department. The delegation had "fraternal and triendly" talks with Li, who also feted the visitors at a banquet at which Li expressed Chinese support for the NLHS five-point political solution and promise: "full support" for the struggle of the people of Laos and the other Indochinese countries "until final victory." (Peking first went on record as endorsing the NLHS five-point solution in the 8 March 1971 communique on Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi. The five points as well as 27 April and 22 June 1971 proposals were endorsed in the 26 November 1971 joint communique on Pham Van Dong's visit to Peking.) The theme of Asian unity, which has largely faded from Peking propaganda in the course of improving Sino-U.S. relations, appeared in NCNA's characterization of the banquet as taking place in "a warm stmosphere of unity and friendship between the people of China, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Korea."

The delegation arrived in Moscow on 5 July for a "friendly visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee." It was met by Polithuro candidate member D.F. Ustinov; P.T. Pimenov, secretary of the AUCCTU; R.A. Ulyanovskiy, deputy chief of the CPSU department for foreign relations; Lt. Gen. Skorikov, who is an aviation expert; and Vice Admiral G.V. Yurin, deputy chief of the main engineering directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

An NLHS delegation led by vice chairman Kaysone Phoumvihan visited Peking in March and April 1971 on its way to and from the CPSU congress. The group received high-level treatment both times, having been received by Chou En-lai. In March it participated, along with the other Indochinese delegations, in a "victory barquet" hosted by Chou to celebrate military victories in southern Laos and South Vietnam. Freviously, an NLHS delegation headed by NLHS Central Committee member Tiao Souk Vongsak visited the PRC in October-November 1969. The last previous high-level NLHS delegation to visit the USSR was the one which attended the CPSU congress. Earlier visits -- which received minimal publicity -included a Laotian Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee delegation led by NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit which visited Moscow in late May 1970 on its way home from a Cairo solidarity conference. A delegation led by NLHS Central Committee member Phau Phimphanchan was briefly reported as present in Moscow in mid-October 1970 in connection with a solidarity week.

Approved For Release 2005/00/05/DENT-FNDP85T00875R000300050028-0

- 23 -

ROGERS IN EAST EUROPE

HUNGARIAN, ROMANIAN, YUGOSLAV MEDIA GIVE CORDIAL TREATMENT

Secretary Rogars' visits to Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia were given generally ample and cordial news coverage by the local media which hailed the visits in limited comment as a positive contribution to coexistence. The Budapest leg of the trip was described as a "significant" step in the development of Hungarian-U.S. relations in the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP. The Romanian party organ SCINTEIA hailed the outcome ci the Bucharest talks as a contribution to coexistence and the favorable development of Romanian-U.S. relations. Acutely aware of Soviet sensitivities about alleged U.S. "bridge-building" efforts in Eastern Europe, Budapest's coverage was less comprehensive than that of Bucharest and Belgrade, and the comment was more retably defensive in insisting that the visit accorded with Hungary's "coordinated" foreign policy with its socialist allies.

HUNGARY While Radio Budapest provided ample coverage of the Secretary's 6-7 July visit, the central press—in evident deference to Soviet sensitivities—played the trip in lower key. On 6 July Radio Budapest prominently reported the Secretary's arrival and schedule of activity on all major news programs, whereas the next day the central dailies publicized the Secretary's arrival on page three and carried only brief reports of toasts exchanged between him and Foreign Minister Peter at an official luncheon. On the 8th the central press gave frontpage attention to the details of the visit, including the Secretary's talks with Hungarian leaders, as well as his departure for Yugoslavia. However, the papers did not publish any photographs of the Secretary, nor did they mention his press conference and departure statement.

An article in the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 9th—the only Hungarian commentary on the visit—hailed the outcome of the talks as "a significant step" in the development of relations between the two countries. It went on to cite the "tangible" results of the talks—a consular agreement and scientific cooperation accord—as well as "the constructive atmosphere of the discussions as evidence that Hungarian—U.S. relations will continue to develop."

- 24 -

In deference to Soviet sensitivities, the paper defensively insisted that the visit is "in keeping with the coordinated policy of the socialist countries and the principle of peaceful coexistence." In effect using Moscow's rationale for improving U.S.-Soviet relations for its own purposes, the article added: "Like its socialist allies, Hungary professes that peaceful coexistence constitutes the only possible way to avoid a nuclear war . . . and is genuinely willing to cooperate if a partner with a capitalist social system is willing to accept relations based on equality and mutual advantage."

ROMANIA Romanian media gave extensive coverage to all phases of the Secretary's 5-6 July visit to Romania while seeking in limited comment to depict it as a positive exercise in coexistence and as a demonstration of Bucharest's right to pursue an independent foreign policy. In addition to the ample coverage provided by Bucharest radio of the Secretary's activities, the Romanian dailies, SCINTEIA and ROMANIA LIBERA, devoted prominent attention to the trip. After noting his visits to Bahrain, Kuwait, and Greece, in the issues of 4 and 5 July, both papers carried reports of Rogers' arrival in Bucharest, his activities in the capital, and the toasts exchanged at a dinner given in his honor by Foreign Minister Manescu. As if to underline the success of the visit, on the 7th SCINTEIA carried a frontpage picture of the Secretary's meeting with Ceausescu as well as frontpage reports of Rogers' other activities.

Summing up the results of the trip in SCINTEIA's international review on the 9th, authoritative commentators Caplescu and Bogdan called it "a useful contribution to the development of Romanian-U.S. relations, in the interest of both countries and in the interest of detents and understanding among people and general peace." The paper added that while Romania shows "constant concern" for expanding relations with the socialist countries, it develops cooperation with all states "regardless of their social systems." It went on to assert that "all states regardless of their potential, size, or force, have the right and duty to actively participate in the international dialog and to have their say in support of international peace and cooperation."

Although the Caplescu-Bogdan review did not offer any comment on the Vietnam issue in the context of Rogers' visit, it followed up remarks on negotiations between the two Koreas and the Simla talks between India's Gandhi and Pakistan's Bhutto with an appeal for a compromise settlement of the war in

- 25 -

Indochina. Underscoring that the only way to solve that conflict is through negotiations, the paper notably took a balanced view in urging both sides to approach the Paris talks from "constructive positions" and with "the derire to meet opposite positions halfway."

YUGOSLAVIA Yugoslav media gave ample and prominent coverage to Rogers' 7-9 July visit to Yugoslavia which went beyond the protocol for such occasions. But to date there has been no followup press comment on the trip.

Although the Yugoslav central press predictably gave more prominent coverage to President Giri of India--whose visit to Belgrade coincided with that of Rogers--it gave the Secretary's visit frontpage treatment. Both BORBA and POLITIKA published frontpage reports of Rogers' arrival as well as photographs of the Secretary and Foreign Minister Tepavac at the airport. On the final day of the visit the press played up Rogers' meeting with Tito. Under the headline "Tito Received Rogers," POLITIKA carried a photo of the Yugoslav president and the Secretary. The paper also publicized a TANJUG report quoting Secretary Rogers' comment that his talks with Tito "were very fruitful" and "we agreed that relations between Yugoslavia and the United States are excellent."

MOSCOW REACTION Soviet media played down Rogers' visits to the East European capitals. It provided only terse news reports of his arrivals and departures and the results of the visits, but gave little information on the substance of the Secretary's speeches. Soviet sensitivity over the visit to Bucharest seemed reflected in an atypical TASS report of Rogers' comments on the progress of U.S.-Romanian relations. It singled out for quotation his remarks that since President Nixon's visit to Romania in 1969, U.S.-Romanian relations have been developing "unprecedentedly" and that the U.S. program for exchange visits with Romania "is growing faster than all other similar programs in Eastern Europe."

- 26 -

FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE CONCEDES IMPASSE, URGES EARLY RESUMPTION OF TALKS

The Czechoslovak Communist Party daily RUDE PRAVO on 8 July belatedly confirmed that the impasse over declaring the Munich agreement invalid ab in the was not broken at the fifth round of the PRG-CSSR exploratory talks held in Prague at the end of June. This had been revealed earlier by the FRG representative immediately after the conclusion of the talks. The RUDE PRAVO commentary disapproved of what it portrayed as a West German desire to suspend the talks indefinitely and called for their resumption "without delay."

Prague comment leading up to the 29-30 June bilateral talks, the first since last November, had taken its cue from Husak's 12 June trade union congress speech in & ftening the standard CSSR demand that the FRG acknowledge the invalidity of the Munich pact from its inception and in predicting "mutually acceptable" results from the talks.* But the CTK report on the latest round merely said the two sides "decided to inform their respective governments on the results of the talks held so far," with no mention of any agreement regarding their continuation as the Prague report on the November round of talks had done. Hamburg DPA on the 30th had carried a statement to West German journalists by the FRG representative. State Secretary Frank, after the end of the talks, revealing the CSSR side's rejection of two FRG proposals on the Munich issue during the latest round and an agreement by the conferees to recommend to their respective governments "a pause for reflection."

PRAGUE REACTS The RUDE PRAVO commentary on the 8th took the tack of reporting Frank's favorable characterization of the atmosphere of the Prague talks, which were to prepare for the opening of official negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations, and of rejecting anew the two West German proposals without tying them directly to the FRG representative. Blaming West German information media and "reactionary" forces for the failure to reach agreement in the talks, RUDE PRAVO said "part" of the West German press had portrayed the latest round of talks "in the darkest colors" and was "writing about disappointed hopes, about a failure, and even about a wreck of

^{*} See the TRENDS of 6 July, pages 27-28.

- 27 -

the talks." For its part, the paper added, the Czechoslovak side had "observed what had been proposed by the other side: not to dramatize the situation, for the sake of the continuation of the talks." Further underscoring the alleged pressures on the Bonn government, it remarked that "unfortunately, even the Federal Government, obviously fearing the pressure of these reactionary forces, hesitates to meet Czechoslovakia' justified demand" on the issue of Munich.

In Prague's most direct reportage to date on the substance of the talks at the five bilateral sessions, RUDE PRAVO said the West German side had proposed, first, "to conclude an agreement which would not contain a single word on the so-called Munich agreement" and which "would only guarantee the present frontier between Czechoslovakia and the FRG which, as is well known, was not questioned even by Adenauer." The second FRG proposal, it said, was "to establish diplomatic relations, while both sides would declare that they will deal with the Munich agreement some time later." Rejecting these proposals outright, the commentary recited the existing precedents for declaring Munich invalid ab initio--by two signatories of the Munich pact, France "during the time of the war" and Italy "later," and by the East German regime "many years ago." It said the Czechoslovak side in the latest talks declared that recognition of the nullity of the Munich pact from its inception "would on no account affect the validity of individual legal acts between physical persons or their family affairs"--an allusion to fears that German civil acts concluded in the Sudeten area after its takeover by Germany would be invalidated. Regarding guarantees on this score, the paper said the CSSR representatives in the talks "even asked the West German side to formulate these demands itself."

The commentary observed that "now there is, as the West German side wished, 'a break for thinking,'" adding, however, that Czechoslovakia "opposes any delays in the negotiations, because it does not see any reason why an agreement could not be reached before the elections to the Bundestag, even if they are to take place before the end of this year."

HUNGARIAN

Pressure on the West Germans to acknowledge the SUPFORT

Munich pact as invalid ab initio was exerted anew in the communique ending the 7-9 July visit to Bratislava by Hungary's Kadar. As reported by CTK on the 9th, and by TASS the next day, the communique said Kadar and his host, Husak, agreed that "in the interests of peace and security in Europe it is very important that the FRG should recognize

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 JULY 1972

- 28 -

the nullity of the Munich agreement ab initio." Highlighting this demand, a commentary on the two leaders' talks in the 11 July Bratislava PRAVDA said that "this formulation, following from a realistic evaluation of the situation and from the overall historical development, shows that . . . it is a matter of a step towards historical justice, renouncing lawlessness and violence, a step in the interest of peace, security, and stability on the European continent." The Slovak party daily added that "this is why the other socialist countries unanimously support this natural demand."

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 29 -

USSR-SYRIA

"SATISFACTORY" RELATIONS REVIEWED DURING AL-ASAD MOSCOW VISIT

Propaganda surrounding the 5-8 July visit of a Syrian party-government delegation to Moscow led by President Hafiz al-Asad indicates no new developments in Soviet-Syrian relations and no progress, on the Soviet side, in selling the Syrians on a friendship and cooperation treaty along the lines of those concluded with Egypt and Iraq. Unlike the Soviet-Iraqi exchanges of "official friendly" visits in February and April, the al-Asad visit was labeled merely "official"—the same characterization as of the Mazurov visit to Syria in February, leading a Soviet party-government delegation. The atmosphere of the current talks, according to the communique, was "cordial and friendly," as in the February discussions—an improvement over the "frankness and friendship" of al-Asad's Moscow talks in February 1971.*

Talks began on the 6th in "friendship and mutual understanding" and concluded in a "warm and comradely atmosphere" on the 7th, when Brezhnev joined the Soviet delegation for what was apparently his only meeting with the Syrians. Podgornyy and Kosygin were reported as present for all major functions, with Podgornyy speaking at a banquet on the 6th; no speeches were reported at Al-Asad's return luncheon on the 7th. Al-Asad, departing on the 8th, apparently made an overnight stopover in Sochi, arriving in Cairo the following day for talks with represent President as-Sadat before returning to Damascus. TASS, reporting the Cairo talks, cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as saying discussions would deal with the Middle East situation, questions "related to the Arab countries' struggle against Israeli

^{*} The 21-26 February visit of the Mazurov delegation is discussed in the 1 March 1972 TRENDS, pages 25-26. Hafiz al-Asad's last visit to Moscow, 1-3 February 1971, is treated in the 3 February 1971 TRENDS, pages 18-19. Differing Syrian and Soviet treatment of the most recent talks, held by Defense Minister Grechko in Damascus 10-14 May, is discussed in the 17 May 1972 TRENDS, pages 32-35.

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 30 -

aggression," and the results of al-Asad's Moscow talks.* (The Beirut paper AN-NAHAI, as reported by Jerusalem radio on the 11th, said al-Asad won Soviet support for his view that Egypt and Syria should agree to a general exchange of prisoners with Israel in return for the five Syrian officers taken prisoner by the Israelis in Lebanon on 21 June, and that he went to Cairo to seek Egyptian acceptance.)

BILATERAL Unlike the February communique, which reported the RELATIONS signing of a new agreement on economic and technical assistance, the present document makes no reference to further agreements. TASS did, however, report without elaboration the signing on the 8th of an economic and technical cooperation agreement and an agreement establishing a Soviet-Syrian commission for such cooperation. Podgornyy remarked in his banquet speech on the 6th that the talks confirmed the sides' "constructive approach" to the examination of "practical problems" in bilateral relations—seemingly an echo of the February 1971 communique which also referred to practical problems in the development of cooperation.

There was no specific reference in the current communique to Soviet assistance in such areas as the Euphrates hydropower complex and the oil industry, as in the February 1971 and 1972 communiques. Instead, President al-Asad "informed the Soviet side" about "his country's experience" in developing oil resources and in nationalization of Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) assets, efforts "highly assessed" by the Soviet side. The two parties, according to the communique, stated their support for measures taken by Arab countries in the field of "working oil deposits by their own means" and insuring their national rights in oil wealth. Podgornyy in his banquet speech praised Iraq's and Syria's "bold progressive steps" in oil nationalization and counseled that "similar concerted actions by Arab countries" would facilitate consolidation of Arab unity on an anti-imperialist basis.

^{*} Egyptian Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi will arrive in Moscow on the 13th, according to TASS on the 12th, for a "friendly business visit" to discuss "questions of further developing" Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. MENA, which announced the Sidqi visit on the 11th, said the prime minister had twice on the previous day received the Soviet ambassador, who conveyed a message from Moscow "in connection with certain matters of interest to both countries."

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 31 -

In the field of military cooperation, the communique recorded the sides' agreement on 'measures for further stringthening Syria's military potential, on continuing military cooperation," and on "exchanging views and holding consultations" in this field. (The AN-NAHAR article reported by Jarusalem radio said that al-Asad asked Soviet assistance in "changing part of the Syrian military deployment" because Damascus feared the captured Syrian officers had divulged important military secrets to Israel.) The February communique had said only that "possible steps" for promoting Syria's defense capabilities were discussed; Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's May visit to Damascus resulted, according to TASS, in "an arrangement for taking a number of additional measures" in military cooperation. although Damascus merely reported "fruitful discussions" on such cooperation. Unlike the February 1971 and 1972 communiques. the Syrians this time failed to express gratitude for Moscow's "defense" assistance, but al-Asad did "inform" the Soviets about Syria's achievements in social and economic reforms and in "strengthening its defense capacity."

The sides expressed satisfaction with their "time-tested" friendship and confirmed their determination to struggle against any attempts "aimed at undermining friendship and cooperation between socialist countries and Arab states." This would appear to be as far as Damascus is prepared to go in subscribing to the line--appearing in last October's Soviet-Egyptian communique and the 17 February Soviet-Iraqi communique--condemning "imperialist" efforts to foment anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and disrupt Arab-Soviet friendship. While there was no hint that Moscow still seeks a treaty arrangement with .. Syria, Podgornyy remarked cryptically, in noting close Soviet cooperation with Syria, Egypt, and "other progressive Arab states," that the Soviet side "is prepared also in the future to consider most attentively the vital questions proceeding from this principled line."* Podgornyy also dealt approvingly with the creation of Syria's Progressive National Front; clearly with Iraq in mind, he observed that Syrian experience in the matter of uniting progressive forces was not only of importance

^{*} MENA on the 12th, reporting from Damascus on Syrian assessments of the "positive results" of al-Asad's visit, said Soviet-Syrian relations "are so strong and stable" they "do not need to be confirmed by the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation."

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 32 -

for Syria, "but, one would think, for other peoples, too, that have taken the road of independence and social transformations."

Party ties were couched on briefly in a routine passage in the communique noting the "successful development" of these relations and the sides' "mutual desire" for their further development. In his banquet speech Podgornyy declared that "we attach great importance to strengthening contacts along party lines." And Belyayev, in the 9 July commentators roundtable broadcast by Moscow's domestic service, viewed the "strengthening contacts" between the CPSU and the Syrian Ba'th Party as producing a closer approach on "major sociopolitical problems" in the Middle East and reinforcing the positions of Arab "progressive forces." As in the previous February communiques, the present document affirms the sides' readiness to "continue consultations" at various levels on all important international questions as well as on further developing bilateral relations.

ARAB-ISRAELI Despite al-Asad's explanation in an 8 March speech CONFLICT that Syria would support, or oppose, Security Council Resolution 242 depending on how it was interpreted, the Soviet-Syrian communique again made no reference to that resolution in calling for a just and lasting peace based on full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories and on ensuring the lawful rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine. Podgornyy discreetly did not refer to Resolution 242 in his banquet speech, but Soviet support for the resolution was reaffirmed in communiques on Gromyko's July visits to the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The communique blamed the impasse on the "expansionist aggressive policy" pursued by Israel, twice underlining U.S. support for Tel Aviv. The Soviet side confirmed its "resolution to assist a just solution," reminiscent of the pledge by both sides, in the Soviet-American communique on President Nixon's USSR visit, "to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement." In the present communique, the Soviets added a confirmation of readiness to support the struggle of Syria, Egypt, and other Arab states for speediest liquidation of the "aftermaths of Israel's imperialist aggression."

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

CONFIDENTIAL

TBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 33 -

Podgornyy in his banquet speech rejected "allegations" that the Soviet Union is interested in preserving a "no war, no peace" situation in the Middle East. He identified the source of these "deliberate lies" only as "slanderous concoctions of imperialist propaganda," insisting that the USSR supports a just and lasting peace which would take into account the interests of "all" the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians. TASS on 2 July had taken note of AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal's series of articles discussing the positions of the "four main parties"--Israel, the United States, the USSR and Egypt -- with regard to the state of no war, no peace. Identifying Haykal only as "a political commentator" for AL-AHRAM, TASS said he refuted contentions that the Soviet Union was interested in the preservation of this situation. Haykal in fact had concluded in his 30 June article that the USSR wished this situation to end in the Arabs' favor, but in his 7 July article he asserted that Egypt was the only one of the four chief parties which had no interest in continuation of this state.

Moscow had earlier, in a 6 June Arabic-language broadcast, defensively claimed to be "firmly fighting the so-called attitude of 'no peace, no war,'" adopted by "the Israeli aggressor and its imperialist protectors." And a 7 July commentary broadcast in Arabic, noting Podgornyy's "suitable reply to this drivel," argued that Soviet-Arab cooperation could only be served by a settlement of the Middle East dispute, since the "large sums" set aside by the USSR "to support the defensive capacity" of the Arabs could then be applied to "great new constructive works" furthering Arab social and economic progress.

CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 12 JULY 1972

- 34 -

KOREA

JOINT STATEMENT ON REUNIFICATION GETS CONTINUED PUBLICITY

Pyongyang has marshalled the usual assortment of supporting statements from the heads of various public organizations and congratulatory messages from sympathizers abroad in continuing to give extensive publicity to the 4 July North-South joint statement on peaceful reunification. Depicting Kim Il-song as the motivating force behind the agreement, the comment focuses on Kim's "three principles" of reunification as the "most important" part of the agreement. Short shrift is being given to the narrower, more specific points on North-South contacts, although many of the spokesmen for social organizations call for contacts with their counterparts in the South.

Pyongyang appears to have given a rather limited interpretation to the point in the joint statement in which the two sides agreed to refrain from mutual "slander" and "defamation." The propaganda has maintained low-level attacks on "suppression" in the South, although it has carefully refrained from naming the ROK Government or President Pak. Attacks have been directed at the "South Korean police authorities" and "military quarters," and "the present rulers" and the "South Korean authorities" have been mentioned in an uncomplimentary context. The terms "scoundrels" and "flunkeyist traitors" have been used in a context clearly indicating the South Korean Government.

At the same time, however, Pyongyang has placed the main onus on the United States for maintaining North-South tensions. A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and a NODONG SINMUN Commentator's article on 8 July strongly attacked the United States for "sch" ing to obstruct" the Korean struggle for independent, peaceful reunification, referring to the 5 July statement by the State Department spokesman that the United States will continue its program for modernizing the ROK armed forces and does not plan to reduce the U.S. troop contingent in South Korea. The foreign ministry spokesman demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea "under the signboard of the United Nations Command" and the dissolution of UNCURK.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/06/08: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050028-0

FBIS TRENDS
12 JULY 1972

- 35 -

PEKING Peking authoritatively supported the Korean joint statement with a 9 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a major speech by Chou En-lai on the same day hailing the agreement. Other Peking publicity has included picku, s of Pyong ang comment, including the foreign ministry statement attacking the United States, and a report of a press conference by the DPRK ambassador in Peking.

Both the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial—entitled "A Good Beginning"—and Chou's speech lauded the agreement in terms suggesting that the Chinese welcome the development as a sign of detente in Asia.

According to the editorial, this move will have "a positive impact on the development of the situation in Asia and the world." The editorial repeatedly used the standard formulation referring to "the independent peaceful reunification" of Korea, and it made a point of emphasizing that an accommodation should be achieved by the people directly involved without outside interference. Chou cited the Korean agreement along with the Indian—Pakistani accord and the new Japanese prime minister's call for normalizing Sino—Japanese relations to hail "an irresistible trend" toward efforts by people "to settle reasonably their mutual disputes" free of superpower control.*

Both PEOPLE'S DAILY and Chou reiterated the demand for the with-drawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, Chou calling them "the forces of the United Nations Command," but neither mentioned UNCURK.

MOSCOW Moscow has continued to give the Korean agreement minimal publicity, with brief reports of some of the Korean comment including the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement attacking the United States. Moscow also briefly reported that the DPRK ambassador in Moscow held a press conference in connection with the joint announcement.

While expressing support for the DPRK's stand on "peaceful unification," Moscow has offered no direct comment on the new agreement. A 6 July Radio Peace and Progress commentary, for example, cited the Indo-Pakistani agreement and "the growing support for the just stand of the DPRK on the question of unifying the homeland" as examples of a shift in Asia toward "normalizing" the situation

^{*} The lesson Chou drew for the Vietnam conflict is discussed in the Indochina section of today's TRENDS. Thus far there has been no mention of the Korean agreement by Hanoi, which normally does not address itself to developments relating to Korean reunification.